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ABSTRACT ■ This article presents the first systematic empirical analysis of all
European Companies established at the time of writing, and focuses on
industrial relations issues and the negotiated rules of employee involvement
in particular. It elaborates on the election procedures, the special negotiation
body and the mechanisms of employee information and consultation and
board-level representation. Some tentative conclusions consider the likely
impact on the development of European industrial relations.
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Introduction
The proposal to create a European Company (Societas Europaea or SE)
dates back to the 1960s but was accomplished only in late 2001, with the
Council ‘Regulation on the Statute for a European Company’ and the
‘Directive supplementing the Statute for a European Company with
regard to the involvement of employees’. The Directive had to be trans-
posed into national law within three years, though some member states
took longer (Gold and Schwimbersky, 2008). The European Company
Statute (ECS) is purely enabling, creating the option to establish a
Europe-wide legal structure, leaving existing national forms untouched. It
facilitates a unified management and reporting system instead of the need
to operate under substantially differing national laws and provisions.
We do not discuss here the protracted history of the ECS, nor the legal
technicalities; our focus is an empirical analysis of all presently existing
SEs, that is, those established in the first three years since the ECS took
effect in October 2004. These early cases are relevant as examples of the
first negotiated rules of employee involvement, setting a precedent for all
future SEs. Our focus is on issues of industrial relations in general and
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employee involvement in particular, because these have been widely
neglected in the existing literature that is dominated by legal expertise.
Therefore we concentrate on the Directive rather than the Regulation.
The article is based on an analysis of the existing literature (including
the rapidly growing ‘grey literature’),1 a series of semi-structured inter-
views with representatives of both sides and non-participating observa-
tion in some official meetings. Individual SEs have to be taken as the
point of departure, but we do not provide a simple catalogue but a sys-
tematic analysis. We develop an empirically based conceptual frame of
analysis which can be updated and expanded in order to cover future
cases.
In the article we first present a short summary of established SEs, then
elaborate on the complicated election procedures on the employees’ side.
The following two sections indicate details of employee involvement
through SE works councils and board level representation. We end with
tentative conclusions and predictions.
The Establishment of SEs: An Empirical Overview
Forms and Numbers of SEs
An SE can be established in one of four ways:
● by merger of two or more existing public limited-liability companies,
● by formation of a holding company by two or more public or private
limited liability companies,
● by formation of a subsidiary by two or more companies (or from a
SE itself),
● by transformation (conversion) of an existing public limited-liability
company.
Different sub-forms can be identified (Gold and Schwimbersky, 2008;
Schwimbersky, 2006; SEEurope-Network, 2007): there are some with
unusual characteristics from an industrial relations perspective. Three of
them are the most important in quantitative terms: ‘empty’ SEs,
which are economically active but have no employees; ‘shelf’ SEs, which
are inactive; and ‘UFO’ SEs, for which only few details, such as their
names, are known from the registers. This most recent, semi-official term
means companies that are most likely also ‘shelf’ or ‘empty’ SEs.
Furthermore, there are additional types such as sold shelf SEs, failed
SEs and liquidated SEs (SEEurope-Network, 2007). Companies which
are active but with a minimal number of employees might be con-
sidered a further category.
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TABLE 1. Registered SEs
Company (Name) Type Location of headquarters
Abatus Invest SE shelf Germany
Afschrift SE UFO Belgium
Alfred Berg SE normal Sweden
Algest SE UFO Luxembourg
Allianz SE normal Germany
Arcelor Steel Trading SE UFO Netherlands
Artemis Global Capital SE UFO Germany
Atrium Achte Europäische VV SE shelf Germany
Atrium Dritte Europäische VV SE shelf Germany
Atrium Elfte Europäische VV SE shelf Germany
Atrium Neunte Europäische VV SE shelf Germany
Atrium Vierte Europäische VV SE shelf Germany
Atrium Zehnte Europäische VV SE shelf Germany
AUFID SE UFO Liechtenstein
Beiten Burkhardt EU-Beteiligungen SE shelf Germany
Beteiligungs- und Investment SE shelf Germany
Bibo Zweite Vermögensverwaltungsges. SE UFO Germany
Blitz 07–242 SE shelf Germany
Blitz 07–243 SE shelf Germany
Blitz F07-zwei-siebenundvierzig SE shelf Germany
BluO SE shelf Germany
Bolagsstiftarna International SE shelf Sweden
Bolbu Beteiligungsgesellschaft SE UFO UK
Carthago Value Invest SE normala Germany
Conrad Electronic SE normal Germany
Conrad Holding SE normal Germany
Convergence CT SE (formerly normala Germany
Atrium Erste Europäische VV SE)
Culture Commune SE UFO Belgium
Demonta Trade SE UFO Czech Republic
DIAG Human SE UFO Liechtenstein
Donata Holding SE (formerly Atrium normal Germany
fünfte Europäische VV SE)
EBD Erste Verwaltungsgesellschaft SE shelf Germany
EBD European Business Development SE shelf Germany
EBD Vierte Verwaltungsgesellschaft SE shelf Germany
EBD Zweite Verwaltungsgesellschaft SE shelf Germany
Elcoteq SE normal Finland
Equipotential SE UFO Germany
Eurofins Scientific SE UFO France
Europea Capital SE UFO Czech Republic
Eurotunnel SE UFO Belgium
Fortis Intertrust Corporate Services SE empty Netherlands
(Continued)
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TABLE 1. (Cont)
Company (Name) Type Location of headquarters
Fresenius SE normal Germany
Galleria di base del Brennero normal Austria
Brennerbasistunnel BBT SE
GIS Europe SE UFO Netherlands
Go East Invest SE empty Germany
Graphisoft SE normal Hungary
Graphisoft Park SE empty Hungary
Hager SE normal Germany
I.C.E. Innovative Canmakers Europe SE shelf Germany
Innovatis & Cie. SE UFO France
Innovia PPP Solutions SE shelf Austria
Investimenti Belgium SE UFO Belgium
Istrokapital SE UFO Cyprus
Joh. A. Benckiser SE normala Austria
Jura Management SE empty Germany
Kopstal Real Estate SE UFO Luxembourg
Limagrain Central Europe SE normala France
Luxury & Sport Cars SE UFO Latvia
Lyreco CE SE normal Slovakia
MAN Diesel SE normal Germany
MatMar SE empty Austria
Max Boegl International SE (formerly normala Germany
Sarpedon 2006/01
Vermögensverwaltungs SE)
MDM Holding SE empty Austria
Media Corner SE UFO Belgium
Mensch und Maschine SE normal Germany
Minos 2005 and 01 empty Germany
Vermögensverwaltungs SE
MPIT Structured Financial Services SE empty Netherlands
Narada Europe SE empty Norway
Netcon EZHZ SE UFO Slovakia
NH Trans SE UFO Czech Republic
NordiTube Technologies SE shelf Sweden
Odfjell SE normal Norway
Odfjell Terminals SE empty Norway
Omnia Holding SE UFO Czech Republic
Orchestra Service SE (formerly normal Germany
Pro-Jura0407 SE)
PCC SE normal Germany
Plansee SE normal Austria
(Continued)
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TABLE 1. (Cont)
Company (Name) Type Location of headquarters
Porsche Holding SE normal Germany
Pro-Jura 0307SE shelf Germany
Pro-Jura 0507 SE shelf Germany
Pro-Jura SE shelf Germany
Prosafe SE normal Norway
Riga RE SE normal Latvia
RPG Industries SE UFO Cyprus
RSL COM Germany SE UFO Germany
Schering-Plough Clinical Trials SE empty UK
SCOR SE normal France
SCOR Global Life SE normal France
SCOR P&C SE normal France
SCS Europe SE empty Netherlands
Seesam Life Insurance SE normal Estonia
SE Reussite Finances Group UFO Latvia
SE Sampo Life Insurance Baltic normal Estonia
SE TradeCom Finanzinvest normala Austria
Sevic Systems SE normal Germany
Solar Equity SE UFO Germany
Solar Invest SE UFO Germany
SR International Business SE shelf UK
Startplattan 39001 SE shelf Sweden
Startplattan 39902 SE shelf Sweden
Strabag Bauholding SE normal Austria
Sunshine Invest SE UFO Belgium
Surteco SE normal Germany
Tchibo Beteiligungsinvest SE UFO Austria
TCN Urop SE empty Netherlands
Tourism Real Estate Property Holding SE empty Netherlands
Tourism Real Estate Services Holding SE empty Netherlands
ViaSky SE UFO Czech Republic
Viel et Compagnie-Finance SE UFO Netherlands
World-Wide-Invest SE shelf Germany
YSL Beauté Benelux SE UFO Belgium
a SE with very few employees or with other unusual characteristics (not
‘normal’ SEs in the sense of our definition).
Source: SEEurope-Network 2007; own additions.
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We do not analyse these ‘abnormal’ forms in detail because they are, at
least for the time being, not of direct interest for industrial relations pur-
poses. In Table 1 we list all SEs – over 100 – registered at the end of 2007,
showing their status and country of headquarters.
‘Normal’ SEs
‘Normal’ SEs with economic activity and employees are of more interest
for the purposes of our study. There are only 28 already established and
registered, and an additional seven others in the phase of foundation.
These ‘normal’ SEs, which are outlined in Table 2, constitute the base of
our empirical analysis – by definition, industrial relations can only occur
if both, employers and employees, exist. In most cases, these SEs were or
will be established by way of conversion (23 cases), while most others
were or will be formed by merger (10 cases) (SEEurope-Network, 2007).
In other words, the formation of a holding company or a subsidiary has
not played a role in these cases. All in all, the sophisticated legal distinc-
tion of forms is of minor practical importance in the cases presently exist-
ing. In two cases, the SE has been established using a shelf SE.
These first cases display no obvious patterns regarding company size,
sector and registered location of headquarters. There are smaller com-
panies with only some dozen employees, and larger ones with a hundred
thousand or more. The very first case was Strabag, with 30,000 employ-
ees; Nordea bank which was of comparable size followed,2 as did some
smaller companies. Allianz, BASF and Fresenius, the ‘big players’, took
longer before adopting the new legal form. Data on a yearly base do not
(yet) indicate clear ‘trends’. There was only a small increase in the over-
all number of registered SEs in 2007 in comparison with 2006 and 2005.
It is too early for such an analysis that will, without doubt, be useful in
the long run. In contrast to the employment threshold specified in the
EWC Directive, the rules on employee involvement in the SE apply
regardless of the number of employees.
As far as the distribution across sectors is concerned there is no clear
trend (yet). Sectors which are more internationalized than others in terms
of production and composition of their workforces have not established
more ‘normal’ SEs.3 It seems that the decision to establish an SE is in
most cases connected with company-specific problems such as a reduc-
tion of complexity (e.g. through a merger) and cost reduction.
So far the vast majority of ‘normal’ SEs was founded in a limited
number of countries: 17 have or will have their seat in Germany and four
in Austria, some others in Scandinavian countries. Interestingly enough,
so far no ‘normal’ SE has been established in the UK or the
Mediterranean EU member states. Few SEs have their seat in the new
member states that joined the EU in 2004 and had to transpose the
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Directive as part of existing Community law.4 Thus so far, and in contrast
to multinationals which are subject to the EWC Directive, eastern
enlargement of the EU has had no major impact. The reason seems to be
that the foundation of SEs constitutes a mere option whereas in the case
of EWCs there is a requirement to adapt to existing regulation. Last but
not least, it is notable that non-European multinational companies have
not yet established SEs.5
The Initiation Phase
Principles
The decision to establish is up to a company’s management and admin-
istrative organs; employees and their representatives have no formal
influence, even though the particular form of establishment has a major
impact on the nature of subsequent employee involvement (Patra, 2006).
For instance the so-called ‘standard rules’ (Article 7 of the Directive),
specifying default standards of employee involvement if the negotiating
parties cannot reach an agreement within the six month deadline, apply
only in the following cases (Köstler, 2006):
● if the SE is established by conversion, and participation rights already
existed;
● if the SE is established by merger, and at least 25 percent of employees
(or fewer if the SNB makes a decision on this issue) previously had
participation rights;
● if the SE is established by the formation of a holding or a subsidiary
and more than 50 percent of employees (or again, fewer if the SNB
makes a decision on this issue) previously had participation rights.
An SE may not be registered with the national authorities before ‘both
sides of industry’ have reached an agreement on employee involvement
at least in the form of information and consultation (Article 12 (2) of the
Regulation).6 In contrast to the EWC Directive, the management or
administrative bodies of the participating companies have to take the ini-
tiative; a special request by the employees or their representatives is not
necessary. For employee representatives from some countries, the SE
provides the first opportunity to influence managerial decision-making
at group level, whereas for others it might reduce their impact.
There is no precise legal provision for the scope and content of employee
involvement. According to Article 4 of the Directive, the agreement shall –
‘without prejudice to the autonomy of the parties’ – only specify items such
as ‘the composition, number of members and allocation of seats on the rep-
resentative body, the procedure for the information and consultation, the
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frequency of meetings and financial and material resources’, and such mat-
ters as the date of entry into force and its duration. The crucial point is that,
in contrast to national regulation in countries such as Germany, all proce-
dural and substantive details are not fixed by legislation but are freely nego-
tiable between central management and the employees of the company
(Blanke and Köstler, 2006; Nagel and Köklü, 2004).
The Special Negotiation Body
In all negotiations during the founding phase, employees of the forthcoming
SE are represented by a ‘special negotiation body’ (SNB) whose members are
elected or appointed in proportion to the number of employees in each
member state. The fairly complicated procedural arrangements share some
similarities with those of the EWC Directive (Müller and Platzer, 2003),
though in contrast to the latter there is proportional rather than geographi-
cal representation of the workforce.
Fulton (2006) and Ioannou (2006) identify three different approaches
to the selection of SNB members: in seven countries, such as Austria or
Germany, they are chosen by national works councils; in 16, such as
Cyprus, Norway and Sweden, the unions choose them; and in Estonia,
Malta and the UK they are directly elected by the employees. The
Directive allows three potential outcomes of the negotiations between
central management and the SNB:
● the ‘zero option’, if the SNB decides (by a two-thirds majority repre-
senting two-thirds of the employees) not to commence negotiations,
or terminates these;
● application of standard rules, in the case of failure to agree within the
deadline;
● an agreement between both sides.
Our data show that most negotiations so far resulted in an agreement.7
In companies with an EWC before the foundation of an SE, the SNB
usually mirrors the composition of the EWC. Cooperation and
exchange of information and accumulated expertise are easier to reach if
some form of institutionalized interaction already exists. SNB members
are also usually organized in their national trade unions. Some SNB
members, especially its chair and the representatives of the countries
with most employees, exert a strong informal influence because they
keep in touch between formal meetings – or even negotiate with man-
agement’s representatives about certain open questions before an ‘offi-
cial’ meeting takes place. If the SNB is large, a smaller negotiation
commission, comparable to the select committee of an EWC, is usually
established.
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External Resources
External experts can be hired by both sides, and central management
frequently hires law firms. On the employee side the number of external
experts is frequently limited to one during the key phase of imple-
mentation, when general prescriptions have to be adapted to national
rules as well as customs and practices (EWCB, 2006). Trade unions sup-
port the activities of the SNB and their national and European represen-
tatives can be full members, if the national legislation implementing the
Directive provides this option. Their status is less contested than under
the regulations for the establishment of an EWC, because of these legal
provisions.
European Industry Federations (EIFs) play some role in these pro-
cesses: as in the case of EWCs (Waddington, 2006) they prepare guide-
lines for the negotiations before the first negotiations take place. The
European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF) was especially active in the
early stages (EMF, 2003), others were inspired by its work (UNI-Europa,
2004). These guidelines are intended to bind the SNBs during negotia-
tions regarding ‘information, consultation and participation rights of
workers in an SE’; ‘the development of these guidelines was not an easy
exercise … because of national differences on this issue’ (Triangle, 2005:
207). These tasks of supranational coordination present new challenges
for trade unions – and their scarce resources.
Processes of Internal Bargaining
Research on EWCs (Lecher et al., 2001, 2002) indicates that bargaining
takes place not only between central management and SNB but also
between employees’ representatives from different countries. External
trade union representatives have a major function in balancing differing
interests and expectations on the employee side, often reflecting ignor-
ance of the customs and practices of other countries.
Conflicts between representatives from different countries also surface
over such questions as simultaneous translation and the distribution of
seats on SE supervisory bodies. Such internal difficulties and conflicts must
be resolved and common positions reached before negotiations with cen-
tral management can be launched without weakening employees’ bargain-
ing position. Mediation of interests by trade union experts, often combined
with reference to the legal requirements, assists in finding a solution.
SE Works Councils
In the SEs which we investigated the ‘representative bodies’, normally
called ‘SE works councils’ (SEWCs), are usually a continuation of
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formerly existing EWCs in terms of membership and structures.
Normally there is a division of competences between new and pre-existing
institutions: the SEWC only addresses issues concerning the SE itself,
while bodies at other (especially national) levels continue to be responsi-
ble for issues of national subsidiaries (Blanke, 2006). It is usually stated
in the negotiated agreements that national bodies may transfer parts of
their competences in specific cases to this supranational level, as long as
this is permitted by national legal requirements.
The agreement on employee involvement also deals with the rights of
SEWCs, so far always limited to information and consultation, with no
bargaining rights. However, some SEWCs (like EWCs) may subsequently
acquire a bargaining capacity, especially over ‘technical’ issues.
Size and Composition
The overall number of SEWC members depends on the number of
employees or, to be more precise, on their national proportionality. In
most cases its composition parallels the former SNB, both in the distri-
bution of seats across countries and in individual membership.
Almost all existing SEWCs are employee-only bodies, as in the
German works council model; only in a French case there is a joint
employee–management committee. This reflects a form of ‘path depend-
ency’: the vast majority of SEs has been established in member states
which have institutionalized this form of employee involvement, where-
as the French case follows the French model.
In the majority of EWCs there exist smaller steering or select commit-
tees for the organization of day-to-day activities (Kerckhofs, 2006).
Similar committees exist in SEWCs, at least in the larger SEs. They usu-
ally consist of the SEWC chair and deputies, and represent the most
important countries in terms of the number of employees.
Resources and Duration
Resources tend to vary with the size of the SE. On issues such as release
from work and dismissal protection for SEWC members, agreements
often refer to (national) ‘provisions applicable in each case’ which means
that members of the same SEWC employed at different national plants
could be covered by different provisions. In most cases two ordinary
annual meetings are to take place with central management, though some
agreements prescribe only one. Extraordinary meetings are also usually
possible. Preparatory meetings are also permitted. All expenses are paid
by the company.
Training is of key importance for the work of SEWCs. A typical agree-
ment states: ‘members of the SEWC have a right to participate in training
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and educational events, insofar as these provide knowledge which is nec-
essary for [its] work’. This can include economic and social matters, and
also language courses. In most SEs, management insist on English as the
working language in order to reduce translation costs, so SEWC members
are often expected to follow English language programmes if necessary.
The SE may also agree to pay for external experts.
Typically an agreement will specify a period during which it cannot be
terminated by either side. This is usually quite long, from four up to
ten years. In some cases, individual sections of the agreement (for ex-
ample, those relating to SEWCs or board-level participation) can be
terminated independently. The period of notice to terminate the agree-
ment is usually six months but can be up to a year. There is one agreement
with very few rights for the employees in which these questions are not
addressed at all.
The Importance of the Standard Rules
As noted above, there are ‘standard rules for information and consulta-
tion’ which apply if negotiations between management and the SNB fail
to reach an agreement. From a purely legal point of view these statutory
fall-back provisions and reference positions do not constitute binding
minimal standards. From our analysis it is obvious, however, that they
serve as the baseline in negotiations and predetermine the scope and con-
tent of agreements in the vast majority of cases.
These standard rules create a certain ‘shadow of the law’. Management
cannot reasonably offer less, at least if it does not want to risk the com-
plete breakdown of negotiations and serious damage to relationships
with employee representatives. The latter know that it will be difficult to
obtain more favourable results without the purely voluntary consent of
management.
The effect of the ‘standard rules’ is comparable to that of the ‘sub-
sidiary requirements’ for negotiations on the foundation of EWCs. Only
a small number of agreements surpass the thresholds specified in these
minimum standards (Kotthoff, 2006). The Directive does allow for
‘equivalent procedures’ instead of an SEWC; but as with parallel provi-
sions in the EWC Directive, this is of no practical importance.
Board-Level Representation
National systems of corporate governance take two main forms. ‘Single-
tier’ systems have only one administrative board (or board of directors);
‘two-tier systems’ consist of a management board and a supervisory
board which monitors the former. The majority of EU member states
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(19 out of 27) provide for some kind of employee representation at board
level (Kluge and Stollt, 2007). There are, however, significant differences
both qualitative and quantitative; variation across countries is even wider
than in the case of employee involvement.
Forms of Corporate Governance
SEs have a free choice between the two forms of governance (though pre-
vious drafts indicated a preference for the two-tier model). Among ‘nor-
mal’ SEs, 20 have adopted a single-tier and 15 a two-tier structure. Not
surprisingly, in most cases management has opted for the governance
structure that prevails in the country of registration (Schwimbersky,
2006).8
There are, however, ten exceptions, most of which are German.9 Why
do some managements opt for a single-tier board when a two-tier struc-
ture is normal in the country of registration? The only common denom-
inator in these cases seems to be that they are owner-managed companies:
the majority share-owners are actively involved in running ‘their’ com-
pany and do not see a need to be controlled by a supervisory board with
employees’ representatives.
Size and Composition
The basic decision on the overall number of board members and, of par-
ticular importance from the employees’ point of view, the number of
employee representatives on the administrative or supervisory board, is
beyond the scope of negotiations between the SNB and management. As
already noted, this decision is made by the owners in the so-called ‘terms
of foundation’, well before negotiations with the SNB are launched. In
principle the terms of this initial decision could be changed in the subse-
quent negotiations on employee involvement; but this is rather unlikely
to happen.
In two-tier systems the decision to establish an SE is occasionally used
to reduce the overall size of the supervisory body, which normally entails
that there will be fewer employee seats. The size and composition of the
governing body have hardly ever been a major topic in negotiations
about employee involvement, although employee representatives have
sometimes tried to introduce this. In most cases it was clear that the
‘terms of foundations’ were not open to amendment. However, the pro-
portion of employee representatives on the governing bodies has never
been reduced through the creation of an SE.
In all SEs, employee representatives on the company boards possess,
at least formally, the same rights as those from the employer’s side.
However, some claim to experience difficulties in obtaining all appropriate
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information. In single-tier systems in particular, some employee board
members report that they are subject to new responsibilities, including
financial liability. This can be particularly problematic if employee mem-
bers feel that they do not receive all the necessary information.
Trade-Offs
In legal terms the decisions on SEWCs and board-level representation are
independent, and some observers have assumed that negotiations on the
two aspects of employee involvement would be separate and would
mainly focus on board-level representation (Mävers, 2002). In practical
terms, however, both forms are interrelated. This opens the possibility of
trade-offs between these two issues: one concerns internal interests on
the employees’ side, for example, employees from a country without rep-
resentation on the supervisory board might obtain an additional seat in
the SEWC. Since outside trade union officials are more interested in
board-level representation than in membership of the SEWC, they
may accept exclusion from the latter in exchange for membership of the
former, simply accepting a role as sources of information, agents of coor-
dination and providers of support for the internal members.
Another type of trade-off again concerns the levels of employee involve-
ment. Concessions in terms of the number of employee representatives at
board-level may be used as an argument for enhanced rights and resources
for the SEWC. The existence of two levels of representation thus creates
opportunities for trade-offs which do not exist in the case of EWCs.
Cross-national trade-offs can arise because representatives from
individual member states (for example, France and Germany) may have
different interests. One group may not be very interested in topics
dealt with at board-level, and opt for strengthening the SEWC instead.
The reasons are that actors are familiar with one set of formal and 
informal rules but not with the other because of lack of experience at
national level. In other words, the latter form is, for ideological and/ 
or historical reasons, not a national priority in all member states 
(Taylor, 2006).
A German Perspective
Some of our findings are of particular interest from a German pers-
pective. Recently there has been a heated political debate in Germany
about the implications of the SE Directive for existing national laws on
codetermination. Some have argued (BDA and BDI, 2004; von Werder,
2004) that countries with extensive forms of mandatory employee
involvement would suffer from being less attractive as country of
registration for SEs. The experience shows, however, that exactly the
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opposite is the case: Germany seems to be a particularly attractive loca-
tion for the establishment of SEs. Though there is simply no evidence
that existing regulations present a competitive disadvantage for compa-
nies based in Germany either to establish or to become part of an SE,
calls to weaken existing rights of codetermination continue.
As we have indicated, the overall number of ‘normal’ SEs so far
is small. It is therefore not justified to assert a general danger for the
national system of codetermination because of developments at EU level.
At least for the time being there is no trend towards ‘escape from code-
termination’ or its ‘erosion’, as is feared by (quite a few) trade unionists.
In the long run, however, differences of interests between national repre-
sentatives might be used by management to weaken existing forms of
employee involvement.
The ‘before and after’ principle means that rights of employee involve-
ment which existed in at least one of the companies establishing an SE
have to be preserved. However, the Directive requires that existing
opportunities of employee involvement are only to be protected, not
necessarily expanded. If only companies from member states without
provisions for board-level participation (such as Italy and the UK) are
involved in the creation of an SE, there is no need for any kind of
employee representation on the board. Some attempts have been made
to change the status quo but were prevented by trade union opposition.
As already mentioned, the vigilance of EIFs may be necessary in this
regard.
Perspectives and Future Relevance
One caveat has to be kept in mind. Our analysis is of a preliminary
nature because it is inevitably too early to assess the actual work and real
functioning of the various forms of negotiated employee involvement
within the SEs, and their impact on national industrial relations institutions
and practices. Our work is thus analogous to the early studies of EWCs
(such as Marginson et al., 1998). Therefore follow-up studies will be nec-
essary in order to evaluate long-term consequences for institution-building
at supranational level. As mentioned in the introduction, our analysis can
be extended to future cases, and could be combined with case studies.
Perspectives
It is very unlikely that a single model of employee involvement will
come into existence. It is realistic to assume that future forms will vary
substantially not only between but also within member states and, even
more, from one SE to the next.
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First of all, existing national regulations differ significantly and exert a
major impact at supranational level. Because the Directive left critical
issues to the political choice of individual member states, there is a diver-
sity of nationally modelled transpositions. The dominance of established
national customs and practices during the phase of transposition process
has strengthened this tendency (for the specific case of the UK, see
Villiers, 2006). These processes were highly politicized and subject to
abundant lobbying activities by national social partners; especially where
there was sharp disagreement, national governments had ample room for
political manoeuvre (Keller, 2002).
Second, all agreements concluded within SEs are tailor-made and
enterprise-specific, because they are the result of free negotiations
between central management and the SNB. In other words, they are
based on the primacy of the principle of subsidiarity, resulting in rather
heterogeneous negotiations.
Any kind of ‘upward harmonization’ of widely differing national rules
towards a unified, genuine European system of industrial relations con-
stituted an ambitious political goal but has proved, as we also know from
other policy fields, not a realistic concept for integration policies in a
diverse polity (van het Kaar, 2006). It constituted the fundamental model
of social regulation during the 1970s and early 1980s, but proved impos-
sible to achieve because political consensus in the form of unanimity
could never be reached in the Council of Ministers. Therefore it had to
be replaced by more realistic, ‘flexible’ concepts. The ECS, as Villiers
comments (2006: 187) ‘does not aim to introduce new or additional
aspects of employee involvement but rather it seeks to prevent the disap-
pearance or reduction of what already existed prior to the establishment
of an SE’. This specific regulation is not about any kind of European
‘harmonization’ but about the preservation of nationally institutional-
ized rules and standards.
Thus the obvious trends towards wide-ranging, ‘flexible’ rather than
unitary and ‘voluntaristic’ rather than binding forms, which had been ini-
tiated by the EWC Directive in the early 1990s, will not only be contin-
ued but even be strengthened. Any tendency towards ‘convergence’
would be a rather unlikely result of these processes; instead, already
existing ‘divergence’ is likely to increase. In other words, high degrees of
diversity or even fragmentation are to be expected as the result of imple-
mentation in individual SEs. Contributions to some kind of
‘Europeanization’ of industrial relations, which a few insiders as well
as outside observers have expected, are unlikely to occur.
The ECS and its supplementing Directive constitute a prototypical 
example of what in another context has been labelled ‘negotiated
Europeanization’ (Lecher et al., 2002). Since the early 1990s this dominat-
ing principle of regulation leaves responsibility for the results with the
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private actors and not the public ones, such as the Commission. Last but not
least, the ECS is an integrated part of the fundamental change from
substantive to procedural regulation. In other words, present legal regula-
tion indicates norms for procedures and modes only, whereas older ones
also included more or less detailed rules of substance. All issues of substance
and content of employee involvement are freely negotiable.
The Future Relevance of SEs
One has to keep in mind that the ECS constitutes a project of economic
rather than of social integration. Within this frame of reference one
crucial question is, of course, related to the future number of SEs – which
in our specific context of employee involvement means ‘normal’ SEs with
economic activities as well as employees. There are two opposing pre-
dictions: one expects a significant increase, the other only a limited
number of new foundations. At least for the time being, the second
scenario seems to be more realistic for various reasons. Alternative
strategies for transnational mergers and acquisitions of companies have
been made available by legal action (the 2005 Directive on the Cross-
Border Merger of Limited Liability Companies and the projected Cross-
Border Transfer of Registered Office of Company Directive).
Consultancies have already developed analyses of the circumstances
under which a cross-border merger is more favourable than other
options such as the establishment of an SE. Choices in individual cases
are impossible to predict.
Creating an SE is supposed to realize economies of scale and savings in
transaction costs (including administrative and legal costs). This advan-
tage is only likely to be a sufficient incentive for management, however,
if large enough to create sufficient incentives. Last but not least, existing
problems of taxation have not yet been solved (Wenz, 2006). A common
EU tax policy which would create a major incentive to establish an SE
does not exist – and is not likely in the foreseeable future.
If this reasoning is correct, the practical impact of the SE on the devel-
opment of the ‘European social model’ in general and European indus-
trial relations in particular should not be overestimated. There could
be, however, another important consequence in the longer run. SEs could
be a major factor in the emergence of supranational ‘enterprise-specific’
industrial relations that would become separated from national systems,
especially from collective bargaining at sectoral level as it exists in the
majority of Western EU member states. Thus it could contribute to new
forms of trans- or supranational ‘enterprise syndicalism’. Such a devel-
opment would increase the already existing degree of fragmentation.
Thus the original idea to establish a unified legal form by means of the SE
would be turned into its opposite.
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NOTES
1 One important source of reference is the ‘SEEurope-Network’ at [http://
www.worker-participation.eu], a project financed by the European Trade
Union Institute and the Hans-Böckler-Stiftung.
2 Nordea has not been registered as an SE yet. There are unsolved problems
regarding the transfer of the banking liability system. Nonetheless an
agreement about employee involvement in the future SE has already been
signed.
3 On the other hand, most of the ‘non-normal’ SEs operate in the financial
sector.
4 These include Graphisoft SE (Hungary) and Lyreco CE SE (Slovakia), and
several small insurance companies based in Estonia (Seesam Life Insurance
SE, SE Sampo Life Insurance, Suomi Mutual Life) and Latvia (Riga RE SE).
There is not much known about these companies. Lyreco CE SE is a
subsidiary of a French company. Some observers argue that the
establishment of an SE in these cases might be a ‘test’ of how this new legal
form works, opening an option for the parent company. Graphisoft SE was
established in the Netherlands and transferred its seat to Hungary, where
most of its employees now work; this is so far the only ‘normal’ SE to
transfer its headquarters from one member state to another. Elcoteq SE has
announced a transfer from Finland to Luxembourg, although it has no
employees there.
5 It was assumed that the SE might be an option for General Motors in order
to merge its European subsidiaries (Opel, Vauxhall, Saab). Such firms may
be waiting until various outstanding taxation questions are resolved
(Wenz, 2006).
6 The management of the planned Zoll Pool Hafen Hamburg SE
(a ‘normal’ SE) tried to obtain registration without such negotiations, and
the application was rejected; management then decided not to proceed
(Blanke, 2005). In some cases concerning shelf SEs, other courts came to
different judgements.
7 Strabag, the first SE, is of special interest in this regard. The owner simply
asked the chair of the EWC to sign an ‘agreement’ stating that all employee
involvement should remain as it was before (i.e. a mainly ‘Austrian’ EWC).
The court registered the SE in October 2004 despite the fact that there had
not been any negotiations. Some trade unions refused to accept this and
initiated court action. After a long dispute, management finally agreed to
negotiate with representatives of all employees concerned, including the
foreign ones, eventually reaching an agreement (Kluge, 2006).
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8 This is also the case with EWCs: most ‘joint bodies’ on the French–Belgian
model are based in France, whereas most ‘employee-only’ bodies on the
German–Dutch model are based in Germany (Kerckhofs, 2006).
9 Conrad Electronic SE, Conrad Holding SE, Donata Holding SE, Lyreco CE
SE, Mensch und Maschine SE, Orchestra SE, PCC SE, Plansee SE, Sevic
Systems SE and one planned SE, Conwert Immobilien Invest AG.
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